What A Financing Scandal In A Canadian City Can Teach Us About Ethical Conduct In Government/Business Relations by Carson, A. Scott
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 3, Number 5 
 55 
What A Financing Scandal In A Canadian 
City Can Teach Us About Ethical Conduct 
In Government/Business Relations 





In the mid-sized City of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, a lease-and-lease-back transaction was 
arranged with a private sector financial institution to fund the construction of a public park 
containing ice-rinks, sports fields, a golf course and walking trails. The terms of the transaction 
were misrepresented to the City. But this was not discovered for months after the deal was signed. 
A public inquiry followed. In the process many issues of ethical conduct in municipal governance 
were brought to light. This paper uses the park financing case as a way of exploring some of the 
ethical issues that have broad application to business/government relations. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
n September 2000, the City of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada entered into a transaction with a leasing 
company to finance a public park comprised of sports fields, an athletic complex, walking trails and an 
18-hole championship golf course.  This was a sole-sourced deal.  That is, the City had not issued a 
tender for other bids because it believed that the innovative structure of what was being offered was unique and that 
the effective rate of interest was below anything it would likely receive elsewhere.  The City had been told that it 
would pay an interest rate of 4.73% (approximately 2% below the expected rate if it were to issue debentures – i.e., 
municipal bonds). And, the required repayments over 31 years would be $113 million.  
 
The deal seemed too good to be true.  It was!  Eight months later, amid wide speculation in the press that 
the financing was not what it appeared to be, it was discovered that the City Treasurer had never checked the lease 
payment calculations.  The actual rate of interest was 9.2%, and the amount to be repaid was $228 million, double 
what was approved by the City Council.   
 
It was a scandal.  There were accusations of fraud, lying and misrepresentation against the leasing 
company; charges were made that the City councilors and staff were in a conflict of interest position, and that there 
was a failure by City Council members to exercise reasonable care in their decision making; and it was said that the 
insurance company that ultimately provided the funding for the lease was guilty of poor corporate citizenship.  A 
renegotiation of the terms of the deal in an out-of-court settlement resulted.  The City Treasurer was fired.  There 
was a protracted and very controversial negotiated departure of the City‟s Chief Administrative Officer (or CAO).  
And, a long and bitter public inquiry was held as provided for under the Province of Ontario‟s Municipal Act.  The 
report of the Inquiry, which was released in October 2003, was a damning indictment of administrative 
incompetence and ethical misconduct.  In the municipal elections that followed a month later in November 2003, not 
one of the sitting City Councilors was re-elected.  The fallout continues today with threatened lawsuits and potential 
insurance claims under the “errors and omissions” clause of the policy. 
 
The citizens of Waterloo regard this as a very grim chapter in the City‟s history that after five years is still 
not complete.  But, there are lessons to be learned, many of them pertaining to public sector governance, especially 
with respect to the ethical conduct required of government officials (both elected and salaried administrative staff) 
in dealing with the private sector.  As well, it raises important questions about good corporate citizenship in 
I 
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situations where business people know, or should know, that government staff are on unfamiliar turf and have 
significant gaps in their understanding of the deal. 
 
In this paper, I will detail the facts of the case and draw from them four ethical issues that can arise when 
governments deal with business.  It is difficult to avoid making some judgments about what should or should not 
have been done in the RIM case, but my primary intent is to consider the lessons learned for broader application to 
other business/government relationships.  
 
To be considered is, first, what is an elected government‟s duty of care when entering into business 
arrangements with the private sector?  Second, when governments procure services from the private sector, must 
they always tender in order to assure fair value for tax payers and fair access to prospective bidders?  Third, when 
government officials deal with the private sector, do they have more stringent conflict of interest standards to meet 
by virtue of their accountability to the public?  Fourth, when businesses transact with government, do they have a 
special obligation of good corporate citizenship to ensure that the government officials have done, and are capable 
of doing, adequate due diligence? 
  
2.  The Facts of the Case 
 
RIM Park is a pristine 500-acre site in the north part of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.  It contains a 
multipurpose recreational complex, 4 ice rinks, 2 gyms, 18 sports fields, an 18-hole championship golf course and a 
system of walking trails.  It was built at a cost of C$56.7 million and funded by corporate donations, municipal taxes 
and a 31-year lease-and-lease-back financing.  With respect to the latter financing, the City leased the Park to MFP 
Financial Ltd. (MFP) who made an up-front lease payment of approximately C$48 million. MFP then leased the 
Park back to the City for a stream of payments over 31 years.  In a related transaction, MFP sold its interest to 
Clarica Life Insurance Company (Clarica) who provided the cash to fund the lease.  Clarica subsequently sold part 
of its interest to Maritime Life Assurance Company (Maritime Life).  
 
In September 1998, the then Waterloo City Treasurer attended a conference presentation by MFP 
executives that demonstrated the potential for municipal infrastructure financings at exceptionally low interest rates 
(The Hon. Ronald C. Sills, page 49).  Subsequently, in Spring 1999, MFP executives and City staff met several 
times to discuss the possible financing of two municipal projects in Waterloo, a park and a parking garage, at rates 
that would be roughly 2% below the likely borrowing rate if the City were to issue debentures.  Various financing 
structures were considered, but what emerged was purportedly a tax driven approach that would allow a corporate 
partner that MFP would bring into the deal to defer paying tax on the lease payments it was receiving by applying 
the depreciation (known as capital cost allowance) on the assets in the Park against that income.  Part of the tax 
savings would be returned to the City in the form of a lower rate of interest.  The Treasurer was not clear on how 
this tax structure actually worked. But, he trusted the MFP executive with whom he was directly working. 
 
The parking garage project did not proceed, but RIM Park did.  City officials found the potential for low 
cost funding so attractive that it encouraged them to expand the project scope resulting in a cost escalation from 
C$20 million to C$56 million.  Finally, a year later, in May 2000, the MFP executive handling the Waterloo 
transaction sent a letter confirming the rate (though at the Inquiry, the President of MFP said that the letter was out 
of date and was not an authorized offer letter).  He also turned up the heat on the City‟s decision making process by 
saying that the “good rate” would only be available for a few more months.  
 
It should be noted here that the City‟s procurement procedures stipulate that major purchases and services 
need to be tendered – that is, put out to the market for bids.  This was not done because the CAO did not think that 
financing fell under the City‟s procurement regulations.  Also, he was convinced that financing at such a favorable 
rate would not be available elsewhere and, that should the City go to tender, MFP would withdraw its offer.  Further, 
throughout the period that preceded the signing of the lease, City administrators and elected officials (including, in 
one case, the Mayor) attended receptions, hockey games and other forms of entertainment hospitality.  The Chief 
Administrative Officer of the City developed a friendship with the MFP executive.  After the transaction closed, the 
CAO continued to be entertained by MFP in the form of golf tournaments and, ultimately, a paid golf trip to Florida.  
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The City has conflict of interest guidelines that, depending upon the situation, require at least one of (1) disclosure, 
(2) higher-level approval, or (3) decline of the benefit. The CAO and others did none of these.     
           
Finally, the details of the proposed transaction were at no point set out in the form of a term sheet signed by 
both the City and MFP.  So, the structure of the financing between the parties was contained largely in 
conversations, substantially between the City Treasurer and the MFP executive, and in one non-binding letter to the 
City from the MFP executive.  
 
In early September 2000, the City had been informed that the deal must close by month-end, yet the 
repayment schedules had to that point not been included with any of the drafts of the lease agreements that the 
City‟s external legal counsel had been reviewing.  Since the final Council meeting for the month was scheduled for 
September 25, time was getting short.  On September 22, the City Treasurer still had not received the schedules and 
pressed for their immediate delivery.  He was told that the MFP staff was still preparing the final numbers and that 
the schedule would be available soon.  
 
On the day of the Council meeting, September 25, 2000, the City‟s Lawyer insisted that the Treasurer 
remove the financing agreement from that evening‟s Council agenda because the lease payment schedules had not 
been delivered.  Two hours before the Council meeting, the schedules were hand-delivered by the MFP executive.  
Shortly afterward, the City Treasurer confirmed to the City‟s Lawyer that he had checked the schedules and that 
they reflected the City‟s understanding of the financing costs.  At the City Council meeting that evening, there was 
very little discussion or questioning of the proposed transaction either during or following the Treasurer‟s 
presentation.  It passed unanimously.  The Mayor was thereby authorized to sign the agreements, which she did. 
             
A few days later, Clarica confirmed that it had purchased the entire transaction from MFP.  This came as a 
surprise to the City.  It had not given much thought to how MFP itself would get the money for the deal.  But, 
because Clarica‟s head office was in Waterloo, and it was one of the City‟s largest employers, it somehow seemed to 
City officials that the purchase should have been disclosed earlier.  In any event, Clarica then sold a portion of the 
deal to another insurance company, Maritime Life, and the full transaction was complete. 
 
In the early spring 2001, six months after the lease had been signed, the City was in the process of doing its 
long-range capital budgeting.  However, as staff gathered information for the plan, attempts were made to calculate 
the lease payments.  This was not going well because the amounts being computed were much higher than expected.  
At about the same time, a reporter from The Record newspaper was assigned to do a story on the tax angle of the 
lease.  The paper thought it had uncovered the use by the City of illegal tax loopholes.  It published an article to this 
effect on May 19, 2002 (The Record, May 19, 2001, page A01).  In the process of researching the story, it too was 
attempting to make the lease calculations and coming up with very different amounts than the City had been 
representing (The Record, June 1, page A01).  In the days that followed, several telephone calls and meetings took 
place between City staff and MFP to verify the calculations.  From all of this the City came away comforted that the 
rate was 4.73%, though MFP steadfastly denied in the subsequent judicial Inquiry that any such assurances were 
given.  
 
At the same time that discussions were taking place between the City and MFP, Clarica was asking MFP to 
reassure them that the City truly understood the nature of the transaction.  Clarica had been following the news 
stories during May and knew the information contained in them to be incorrect.  Still, they felt torn between their 
confidentiality obligation to MFP and their discomfort over the adequacy of the City‟s understanding of the deal.  
However, at a meeting on May 29, they asked to be shown the presentation that had been given to the City.  In that 
presentation was a slide that set out the lease calculations and the total amount of C$227 million. MFP told Clarica 
that the news stories about ridiculously low interest rates simply reflected the City‟s “political spin”.  Clarica left the 
meeting satisfied, not realizing that the City had never seen that calculation slide in any presentation from MFP. 
  
The City and MFP met again on May 30 and 31.  More discussions about the calculation ensued because 
the City staff still could not reconcile with the MFP numbers.  At this point MFP told them that the 31- year lease 
required different rates to be applied, and that the “blended” rate was 5.45%.  This was devastating for the City staff 
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members because now they would have to explain why the total cost of borrowing was roughly C$12 million higher 
than expected.  On June 1, City staff met with the Mayor and legal counsel to determine how best to proceed.  The 
decision was to commence litigation and a press release was prepared which tried to explain that the rate was higher 
than expected, but still very good.  
 
On June 4, The Record published a story in which legal action was referenced (though it had not yet 
formally commenced).  Immediately a red flag went up at Clarica.  They phoned the City directly.  The City faxed to 
Clarica a draft of the press release and a letter from MFP outlining the “good rate”.  It was now very clear to Clarica 
that the City did not understand the deal.  The head of the corporate finance group at Clarica went immediately to 
the President of Clarica, who, in turn, telephoned the City‟s Chief Administrative Officer.  The purpose of the call 
was to ask that the City not issue the press release because it was incorrect and would cause embarrassment to the 
City.  
 
 At Clarica‟s request, a meeting took place in the evening of June 4, 2001 between senior city staff, the city 
solicitor, MFP executives, Clarica executives and the Mayor of Waterloo.  At that meeting, Clarica produced a 14-
column spreadsheet showing the total lease payments to be C$227.7 million.  The city staff had only seen a 12-
column version of the document that did not show the lease payments!  
 
Testimony before the Inquiry by the City Treasurer captures the emotion in his reaction: “At that point, the 
documents were circulated around the table.  And that was the first time in – in my life, that I think I could actually 
hear the blood rushing through my veins…. And, as another city staff member said in his testimony: “I guess you 
could say, we went into a bit of a state of shock, because it was at that point that we, at last, finally had – had the 
truth before us.  That, instead of paying somewhere in the neighborhood of … C$112 million, we were going to be 
paying over double that amount….”   
 
As it turned out, there never was a tax angle.  The complex structure only resulted in what was essentially a 
straight loan. MFP pocketed a C$11 million fee.  Half that amount would have been excessive according to Clarica 
(Sills, page 281).  
            
 It was not until June 20, 2001 that the citizens of Waterloo learned the true cost of the Park when Clarica 
confirmed in the local newspaper the actual amounts (The Record, June 20, 2001, page A01).  At the end of June, 
the City announced that it was initiating legal action against MFP (The Record, June 30, 2001, page B01).  
Subsequently, Clarica and Maritime Life were added to the suite (the Record, July 25, 2001, page A01).  The case 
did not go to trial.  In February 2002, an out of court settlement was reached.  The overall repayment amount was 
reduced to C$145.2 million (still C$33 million in excess of the amount approved by Waterloo City Council).  And, 
the effective interest rate was lowered to $7.4%.  This, too, was considerably above the approximate rate of 6.5% 
that could have been achieved if the City had simply borrowed the money by way of municipal debentures.  
              
In April 2002, The Honorable Justice Ronald C. Sills of the Ontario Superior Court was appointed under 
the Province of Ontario‟s Municipal Act to conduct an inquiry.  His report was published 18 months later in October 
2003, just in time for the November municipal election, which, as indicated earlier, was devastating for the then 
sitting Waterloo City Council.  The report contained many conclusions and 31 recommendations.  We will now look 
at some of the ethical issues given rise to by this case. 
  
3.  The Elected Representative’s “Duty of Care” 
 
At any level of government, unless by happenstance, it would be unreasonable to expect elected officials to 
have sophisticated corporate finance expertise; or, for that matter, expertise in enterprise system technology, urban 
planning, infrastructure construction or state owned and operated healthcare systems.  For these are the domains of 
specialists.  But since legislators must make decisions about these matters, is there not some acceptable level of care 
that they should be ethically duty-bound to exercise on behalf of the citizens of the country, province, state, city or 
town that they are governing?  What, then, is a “duty of care” as it relates to public sector governance? 
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It is common to find the obligations of elected officials and public servants to be set out in codes, by-laws, 
regulations or legislative acts.  This is true whatever the political jurisdiction in question.  In the case at hand, the 
Mayor and Councilors of the City of Waterloo are subject to the provisions of the Province of Ontario‟s Municipal 
Act.  The Act requires each municipality in the Province to provide necessary and desirable services, manage and 
preserve public assets, foster the current and future economic, social and environmental well-being of the 
community and deliver and participate in provincial programs and initiatives (Municipal Act, Part 1, Sec. 2).  It is 
performance obligations such as these that constitute what a public official must do in the public interest.  
Committing to discharge these obligations, whether by public oath or employment contract, is what establishes their 
duty of care.  
 
What is the nature of this duty that is owed to citizens?  Two aspects are useful to note.  First, fulfilling 
such a duty requires that one be careful – act with care.  Being careful is a state of mind, a way of thinking about 
things.  It is the mindset of caution and prudence.  No matter what the issue, we should be able to rely on our elected 
leaders to have our welfare top-of-mind.  We want them to be judicious and forward thinking about the implications 
of their decisions.  This is what being careful means.  What this would entail in practical terms is being curious and 
wanting to know.  And this should manifest itself in asking probing questions, challenging and sometimes 
confronting.  It is using common sense, at the level as would be expected of a reasonable person. 
 
The second aspect of a duty of care has to do with the process of exercising the duty.  That is, for an elected 
representative to “take care”, it is not enough simply to be cautious, prudent and judicious.  He or she must do 
something that embodies this mindset.  And that process is diligence.  A careful person is diligent.  Being diligent in 
public sector governance is to do due diligence.  Elected representatives, as individuals, may not understand the 
intricacies of a tax-driven lease-and-lease-back financing transaction or other highly specialized matters.  But theirs 
is not a duty of skill.  They are not obligated to have experience, training and expertise in all matters over which they 
have jurisdiction.  Theirs is the duty of a reasonable person.  What they must do is to assure themselves that all 
necessary steps of the due diligence process have been taken; that all required expertise, both internal and external, 
has been brought to bear on the analysis of the issues at hand.  In other words, the elected representative‟s due 
diligence is not that of a specialist.  Rather, it entails an assessment of the adequacy of a due diligence process, and 
the assurance that it has been carried out. 
 
In the RIM Park case, Justice Sills was highly critical of the elected City Council (Sills, pages 182-83).  He 
certainly would not have attributed to them the mindset of caution, prudence and judiciousness.  After all, Council 
passed the motion to accept the transaction as presented with virtually no questions being asked of the City 
Treasurer before, during or after his presentation at the Council meeting.  And, as to due diligence, Sills was even 
more critical.  He noted that this was the largest transaction in the City‟s history and the Council had relied entirely 
on the City staff, despite the fact that none of them had ever had experience with this sort of financing.  He 
expressed dismay at the inadequate preparation of City staff.  For instance, no attempt was made to expand the 
mandate of the City‟s external legal council to ensure his complete review of the transaction.  Nor was the City‟s 
auditor asked to review the structure of the deal, including what they thought was a tax play.  As Justice Sills 
commented about Council, “Part of their due diligence questioning should have involved pointed questions about 
the process used by staff to ensure that the transaction was valid” (Sills, page 183). 
 
There are lessons to be learned from the RIM Park case that are applicable to elected representatives in all 
levels of government.  Let us start by recognizing that elected governments have political ideologies and agendas.  
And these will impact decisions about policies and the way they are to be interpreted.  However, despite the political 
orientation, governments make a commitment to citizens to perform specific duties of office, whatever those duties 
might be.  A part of this commitment is a qualifier to performance.  It is performance with care.  What this entails is 
an attitude, approach, or perspective – a mindset that puts the interests of constituents first.  Coupled with this is the 
diligence that they must exercise.  Legislators must ensure that all reasonable measures have been taken to consult 
the appropriate expertise in assessing the opportunities and risks inherent in the decision to be made.  They must be 
able to answer the question, is the process that has been followed likely to yield an accurate assessment of the facts, 
details and issues relevant and necessary to making a sound decision?  If so, they have discharged their duty of care.  
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 3, Number 5 
 60 
4.  Procurement of Goods and Services and the Obligation to Issue Public Tenders 
 
 In the RIM case, the senior City officials dealt only with one supplier of financing services rather than 
issuing a public tender.  The Inquiry determined that this was in violation of the City‟s procurement policy.  Clearly, 
this was an administrative process flaw, but does it have anything to do with ethics?  Yes. It has to do with both 
protecting the public‟s interests by providing fair value for tax dollars and fairness to those participating in the 
procurement process as bidders. 
 
 When it comes to safeguarding the public‟s interests by ensuring fair value in procuring goods or services, 
three considerations are important.  The first has to do with quality (or, by implication the qualifications of service 
providers, to deliver quality).  Whether in procuring the services of a public accounting firm to conduct the annual 
audit, or purchasing cement for a public infrastructure project, the goods or services must be of acceptable quality to 
ensure that the public‟s resources are being deployed in their best interests.  Second is economic value.  The public‟s 
interests are served when procurements are made at the least expensive way.  So, if a city was contracting for waste 
disposal services, it should normally go with the lowest bid consistent with an acceptable level of quality.  
 
The third point mediates between the first two.  It is appropriateness.  Contrast two situations.  Think of 
procuring some raw material for a construction project, such as bricks for the exterior walls of a hospital. Once the 
specifications of size and color have been determined, bids for the contract to supply these materials would be 
evaluated on the basis of quality and value.  But suppose that in the process of procuring the services of an architect 
to design the hospital, the request for proposals contained an open invitation to architects to propose design solutions 
to the broad functional requirements of the hospital.  As a result, the bidding firms might come up with very 
different designs and structural ways of dealing with what they understand the needs of the medical practitioners to 
be.  So, when evaluating the proposals, it would not be sufficient merely to apply the principals of quality and value.  
A further level of judgment would be required to determine which design best meets the functional needs of the 
hospital, as well as esthetic, environmental and other considerations.  These other decision making considerations I 
am bringing together under the heading of “appropriateness”.  And, this is usually called into action when the 
procurement in question is open-ended as regards the specifications of the good or service to be provided.  
 
 The other main ethical consideration deals with the process used in procurement and with ensuring that all 
participants are treated fairly.  As I have argued elsewhere (A. Scott Carson, 2002), the procurement process should 
meet three tests of fairness: (1) accessibility, (2) transparency and (3) impartiality.  The first component, 
accessibility, deals with the openness of the process to as wide a range of potential bidders as possible, thus allowing 
all interested qualified companies within the political jurisdiction an opportunity to bid.  This protects against an 
unfair exclusivity that arises when a government opts to deal only with its political friends.  (As an aside, there is a 
further issue that arises when considering the extent of accessibility of the request for bids.  It could be argued that 
bids should be accepted only from companies within a limited political jurisdiction.  This is a difficult issue that 
would take more space to discuss than we have available.  So, it will be left for now as an open issue.) 
 
 Transparency in the process is the next element in process fairness.  It involves ensuring that all 
participants understand precisely what is being asked of them and how their bids will be evaluated.  Some processes 
can be quite opaque and leave bidders feeling that they have been unfairly dealt with because there may have been 
some requirements of the bid presentation or the way it was evaluated that, had they known about them, their bid 
could have been improved.  In other words, they were not judged based on the basis of their true ability.  
 
 Finally, there is the importance of impartiality in making the selection of the winning bid.  A bidder would 
not be treated fairly if its proposal was superior in terms of quality, price and appropriateness but was not selected 
because of political preferences by those in government making the final decision.  The decision, if it is to be fair, 
must be made on the basis of the stated criteria and not some form of bias. 
 
 So, taking together both sets of principles – of fair value to the public and process fairness – we can relate 
them to the RIM Park financing and situations that other governments face in procurement.  Justice Sills in the 
Inquiry found fault with the City‟s decision not to tender and attributed the disastrous result of the financing largely 
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to this (Sills, pages 185-86).  This raises an interesting ethical question that has broad application in municipal 
governance.  Simply stated, should municipal governments procure goods and services by way of tender in each and 
every case without exception in order to ensure fairness in the public interest and to be fair to all potential providers 
of those goods or services?  I think the answer is, usually, but there are justifiable exceptions.  The reason is 
contained in the application of the appropriateness principle outlined above. 
 
 Procurement by public tender has the ethical seal of approval in most cases.  But in some situations there 
should be exceptions, precisely to ensure that the public‟s interests are being served and to be fair to the provider of 
the good or service.  Ironically perhaps, RIM Park might legitimately have been one of them had certain aspects of 
MFP‟s behavior been different.  
 
Above we said that “appropriateness” can in some cases act as a mediator between “quality” and “value” 
when procuring goods or services in which the bids are qualitatively different from each other.  The RIM Park 
financing concept as originally presented to the City of Waterloo had significant qualitative differences from 
conventional debenture financing.  It had a variable lease payment schedule and length of term that could have 
provided significant benefits that would not have been available through conventional municipal financing methods.  
Equally, the promised effective interest rate, had it been real, would have been exceptional; well below anything 
available in the debt markets for municipal bonds.  When the issue of tendering came up in discussion with MFP, 
the company‟s response was that it would withdraw the offer if it had to submit to a tender process.  
 
MFP might have had a legitimate point, as could others in a similar situation.  Leave aside for the moment 
both the unethical way in which the company dealt with Waterloo, and the fact that the financing product was not 
what was ultimately delivered.  Suppose they genuinely had the ability to provide the tax driven benefits of the 
lease-and-lease-back financing.  As a matter of fairness, why should MFP in that circumstance create an innovative 
financing product, give that proprietary knowledge to competitors, then bid against those other market participants 
on the basis of lowest price?  Potentially, they could lose the bid to another company who, with the benefit of MFP‟s 
proprietary knowledge, undercut them in price.  Is there not an argument for innovative suppliers being given an 
opportunity to satisfy a government that its product will meet all of its needs for quality, value and appropriateness, 
and in return be allowed to supply the product without further market competition?  
 
There is a real risk to governments, if they are not prepared to consider the prospect of working with a sole 
provider of a good or service.  If the provider is bringing a genuine innovation, the government would not be able to 
make it available to the public and potentially deprive it of obtaining fair value.  In the process, legislators could be 
acting unfairly to the provider.  
 
 In the RIM case, the claims about low interest rates and a tax-structured lease were clearly bogus.  And, 
based on the evidence heard in the Inquiry, MFP‟s conduct in dealing with City staff was unethical.  But, the bulk of 
the misunderstandings, errors and omissions of relevant facts would have been apparent had the staff done adequate 
due diligence.  Justice Sills says this forcefully (Sills, pages 185-86).  But he goes on to draw an unwarranted 
conclusion.  That is, he recommends that henceforth all financing arrangements should be tendered (Sills, page 187).  
I do not think that he, or we, should conclude this.  If we agree that a thorough due diligence, as part of the duty of 
care, is always essential, it is not necessary to mandate tendering.  
 
 To conclude, the ethical imperatives in protecting the public‟s interest are quality, cost and appropriateness.  
However, an innovative product or service procurement could potentially deliver each of these, even if there is no 
tendering.  The public‟s protection is in the quality of the due diligence.  Conversely, if tendering is always 
mandated, governments cut themselves off from highly innovative goods and services and sacrifice the public good 
in the process.  Tendering is a key element in public sector procurement.  But it is only a means, not an end, to the 
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5.  Conflict of Interest Standards for Public Sector Employees and the “Height of the Bar” 
 
 The issue to be addressed is not whether government officials, elected or employed, should be required to 
adhere to policies on conflict of interest.  Of course they should.  But is there a case to be made for holding public 
sector officials to a higher standard than would normally be the case in the private sector?  
 
Conflicts of interest normally arise when we are faced with either one of two situations.  The first occurs 
when we have two competing obligations or duties.  For instance, a lawyer who represented two clients that were in 
a legal dispute with each other would be in a conflict situation.  The lawyer could not fulfill his or her obligation to 
one client without interfering with the obligation to the other one.  
 
The second situation occurs when we have personal interests, or something to gain, at the expense of our 
obligation or duty to another person, employer, organization, etc.  For instance, the conflict of interest policy in 
force at the time of the RIM Park scandal in part read as follows: “A conflict of interest is defined as a conflict 
between an employee‟s personal interest and his/her responsibility as an employee of the City of Waterloo that 
interferes with or has the potential to interfere with the performance of his/her position in serving the interests of the 
City of Waterloo” (Sills, page 163).   
 
The City of Waterloo policy makes a distinction between conflicts and “potential” conflicts.  But, some 
ethicists also contend that it is not only “actual” or “potential” conflicts, but also the appearance of conflicts that are 
important.  In other words, beyond what does, or may, happen; it is what people think might, or did, happen is key.  
Justice Sills also takes this view when he says in the Inquiry Report, “A conflict of interest may create doubts or 
suspicions concerning the integrity or fairness of decisions made.  The appearance of a conflict may in some cases, 
be as damaging as a real conflict” (Sills, page 163).  Similarly, the Government of Canada‟s values and ethics code 
for all federal government public servants states: “Avoiding and preventing situations that could give rise to a 
conflict of interest, or the appearance of a conflict of interest, is one of the primary means by which a public servant 
maintains public confidence in the impartiality and objectivity of the Public Service” (Values and Ethics Code for 
the Public Service, Chapter 2). 
 
   In municipal and other levels of government, both types of conflict of interest can occur.  For our purposes, 
though, most relevant is the second type.  So, we will focus on conflicts involving the juxtaposition of personal 
interests and obligations to the government.  Let us then look more closely at what we mean by “personal interests” 
and “obligations” in the RIM Park and other similar cases.  
 
 Regulation 435/97 of the Ontario Public Service Act (Sills, page 164) stipulates in, 5(1), that “A public 
servant shall not accept a gift …if a reasonable person might conclude that the gift could influence the public servant 
when performing his or her duties to the Crown”.  The regulation goes on to list those from whom the prohibited 
gifts might come.  The next subsection, 5(2) qualifies the one before saying that it “shall not operate to prevent a 
public servant from accepting a gift of nominal value given as an expression of courtesy or hospitality if doing so is 
reasonable in the circumstances”.  Both points are compatible with the Canadian Federal Government guidelines 
(Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service, Chapter 2). 
 
 So, bringing together the guidelines of each of the City of Waterloo, Province of Ontario and Government 
of Canada, the focus is on the extent to which the gift or hospitality might “influence” the decision making or 
behavior of the public servant in discharging his or her duties to the government.  And, how are we to decide the 
extent of actual, potential or perceived influence?  We are told by the Ontario policy to use the “reasonable person” 
or “reasonable in the circumstances” tests.  Our question now becomes, what is reasonable, and to whom? 
 
 Consider what the issue involving “influence” was in the RIM Park case.  It was brought out in the Inquiry 
that the Chief Administrative Officer of the City of Waterloo, both before and after the leasing transaction was 
signed, had been MFP‟s guest at two company client appreciation day golf tournaments, a Millennium celebration, 
two charity functions, dinner and cocktails at a fireworks show, a regional festival, a Maple Leafs hockey game and 
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a paid golf trip to Florida.  To a much lesser extent, other public servants and the then Mayor attended hospitality 
events.  All of this took place between autumn 1999 and spring 2001.   
 
MFP‟s rationale for this entertainment was business development and client relationship management.  The 
CAO‟s explanation of his conduct was that he had been directed by the City Council to develop business relations 
with individuals and organizations that could be business partners with the City (Sills, page 166).  As Justice Sills 
indicated, “The system of governance in Waterloo not only permitted but also encouraged „schmoozing‟ with 
suppliers by senior staff” (Sills, page 169).  
 
In drawing his conclusions, Justice Sills sidestepped the issue of what influence this might actually have 
had on the CAO‟s judgments and instead found fault with both the COA‟s failure to disclose these benefits, and the 
looseness of the City‟s conflict of interest guidelines.  However, the question of influence pervaded the public‟s 
perception throughout the entire incident.  In the public‟s view, the CAO had not met the “reasonable person” or 
“reasonable in the circumstances” tests.  What, then, would have been reasonable?   
 
Two things are important to consider here.  First is the extent of scrutiny by the public of government 
entities in a democracy.  The media, interest groups, political opposition parties, changing public opinions and 
priorities and the need to face the electorate in elections, cause politicians and public servants to be viewed and 
evaluated on a continuing basis.  Indeed governments at all levels accommodate themselves to this by encouraging 
openness and visibility through a variety of public forums for consultation and disclosure on a wide range of issues.  
So, to a much greater extent than for private sector enterprises, governments are held visibly and publicly to account 
for their actions.  As a result, even perceived conflicts of interest are readily detected under the public microscope. 
 
A second feature contributes to the heightened scrutiny as well.  There can be a large discrepancy in socio-
economic status between the lowest and highest in any given political jurisdiction.  For instance, the State Senate of 
New York must legislate for the poor and low-income earners in the Bronx as well as the Upper East Side 
Manhattan economic elites – and citizens from all of the gradations of income and social positioning in between.  
So, when it comes to perceptions about the influence that hospitality benefits might have on a New York State 
public servant‟s decision on some matter, it depends very much on who is doing the perceiving.  An expensive 
dinner followed by a Rangers hockey game is not all out of keeping with normal business entertainment by 
corporate executives on Wall Street.  And given the high socio-economic status of those partaking of this, rarely 
would such hospitality be seen as anything more than a normal corporate relationship building business practice.  
But, to an hourly paid laborer in the non-affluent Bronx, this could seem luxurious.  Such a person witnessing public 
servants from Albany being entertained by an investment banker or leasing company executive in this way could 
certainly be forgiven for perceiving this as influence buying, or at very least a clear imbalance between public duty 
and personal benefits.  Consequently, when applying the reasonable person, or reasonable in the circumstances test, 
the evaluation of reasonableness will very much depend upon to whom the question is being addressed.  
 
At this juncture one might protest that public servants of good character who act with integrity are no more 
prone to selling political favors for dinners and hockey games than well off corporate executives.  Nothing said here 
should be taken to dispute this.  So, it is important to be clear about why the height of the conflict of interest bar is 
even in question.  
 
The point is not that public officials are more susceptible to actual or potential conflicts of interest.  It is the 
appearance of conflict that is the issue.  Because those who work in the public sector are so publicly visible, and 
because they are evaluated by citizens of such widely ranging backgrounds and life-experiences, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that they will be held more tightly to account than would their private sector counterparts whose 
accountabilities and disclosures are more limited.  And, given the public servant‟s commitment to serve the citizens, 
whether because he or she holds elected office, or provides administrative support to those who do, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that, as a matter of prudence, a higher bar should be set when developing and implementing 
conflict of interest policies. 
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Whether the CAO and others in the Waterloo City government were in fact influenced by the corporate 
largesse or not is beside the point.  It was suspected in the public domain that they were.  What would quite likely 
have been acceptable in the corporate world that MFP inhabited, was not acceptable to many of the citizens of 
Waterloo.  What is instructive about the RIM Park case is the broad applicability of its lesson.  Few government 
employees in a democracy can expect to be far from the glare of public scrutiny over conflicts between personal 
benefit and public duty.  While they might at times envy their private sector counterparts, the different reality of 
their professional lives must be recognized and accepted.  
 
6.  Good Corporate Citizenship When Working with Governments 
  
 Corporate citizenship is a slightly more focused version of a broad theme known as corporate social 
responsibility (CSR).  The literature on CSR has grown massively over the past two decades.  The basic tenant is 
“the voluntary assumption of responsibilities that go beyond the purely economic and legal responsibilities of 
business firms.  More specifically, social responsibility according to some accounts, is the selection of corporate 
goals and the evaluation of outcomes not solely by the criteria of profitability and organizational well-being but by 
ethical standards or judgments of social desirability” (John R. Boatright, page 373).  The sort of things that typically 
are said to illustrate a socially responsible corporation, i.e., good corporate citizen, would be making contributions to 
charities and community oriented organizations, and actively seeking out ways of bettering the community (and 
society as a whole) such as by adopting stringent environmental protection, product safety and employee safety 
standards.   
 
 There is a longstanding debate about whether corporations have social obligations.  The classical view 
against CSR, most forcefully represented by the Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman, is that over and 
above certain basic laws limiting corporate freedoms to enable the marketplace to function, the fundamental role of 
the corporation is to use its resources to make a profit. “so long as it engages in free enterprise and open competition 
with out deception or fraud” (Milton Friedman, 1962, page 133).  Supporting social programs is not the role of a 
corporation.  For management to give corporate funds to charities, for instance, is simply to take money out of the 
pockets of shareholders.  It is essentially a form of taxation.  Donations to charities, social programs, etc. should 
come from shareholders as individual donors and governments through taxation, not from the corporation itself 
(Friedman, 1970, page 33). 
 
     Arguments in favor of CSR at a minimum level contend that business activity in a free market depends at 
very least on such ethical behaviors as honesty, truth and dependability in honoring contracts (Theodore Levitt, page 
49).  Other arguments push this further and look at the changing role of corporations in society.  The contention is 
that because corporations have grown so large and powerful, they play a very different role in society than 
previously was the case.  Their massive size and resource base brings with it a special obligation to promote social 
goals in addition to economics advantages for shareholders.  Essentially, the argument is that because they can 
advance social goals, they should (Keith Davis, page 20; William C. Fredrick; Donna J. Wood). 
 
 We do not have space here to evaluate the cogency of these longstanding arguments and settle the debate.  
So, it is proposed that for present purposes we accept what is arguably the prevailing business view today, that 
corporations have a least some level of social responsibility.  On this basis, we will see how the CSR position relates 
to the role played by Clarica in purchasing the lease from MFP and its subsequent dealing with the City of Waterloo, 
in order to draw wider governance implications.  
 
 In the RIM Park financing, MFP led the City of Waterloo to believe that it would be receiving a below-
market interest rate because of a specialized tax structure.  This was not true, and Clarica knew this.  What were 
Clarica‟s ethical obligations as a good corporate citizen, if any?  
 
To start, Justice Sills did not find that Clarica acted in any way outside of its legal obligations.  He did 
think, however, that the company was ethically bound to ensure that the City actually understood the deal when 
there was so much evidence to suggest that the City did not.  Clarica tried to show the Inquiry that it had acted 
properly by asserting that, as a third party, it had no obligation other than that of confidentiality to MFP.  And, when 
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it finally became fully aware of the City‟s misunderstanding upon seeing the draft press release, the company moved 
swiftly to meet with the City.  
 
 Justice Sills did not accept Clarica‟s claim of third party status.  He pointed to the close proximity in time 
of closing the lease transaction and its assignment to Clarica, the fact that Clarica‟s legal counsel had taken part in 
drafting the lease documentation and the insistence by Clarica‟s legal counsel that the City‟s lawyer addressed his 
opinion letter to Clarica not MFP.  To Justice Sills, this was all one transaction and the most fundamental 
relationship existed between the City who borrowed the money and Clarica who was the lender.  In the eyes of the 
Inquiry, the City‟s lack of knowledge of sophisticated financing structures put it at such a disadvantage that it was 
not a fair transaction between willing parties.  Because there were so many red flags, given the local publicity of the 
sub-market rate in the media and the knowledge Clarica had of the above market pricing of the actual deal, Clarica 
should have known that it was dealing with an unsophisticated party and therefore had an ethical obligation to draw 
the true nature of the deal to the City before it closed.  This was made all the more pressing given the prominent role 
that Clarica and its senior executives played in the community.  What, then, does this tell us about the ethical 
relationship between governments and private sector corporations when doing business together?   
 
 Let us ask two general questions that might help us to understand the broader issues at stake.  First, when 
any two parties enter into a transaction, notwithstanding who they are, are there any circumstances under which one 
party has a moral obligation to inform the other that it is misunderstanding or failing to understand something 
essential to pursuing or safeguarding its own interests?  I suggest that the answer is yes in cases of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, or where one party was prevented from having access to information necessary to establishing 
what is in its interests.  It is important to note here that the issue is not whether one party might have had 
significantly more knowledge than the other.  Rather, it is that one party could not have known, or was prevented 
from knowing, what it needed to know to protect its interests.  In the general case, I think it would be 
uncontroversial to say that based on the premise that ethical dealings must be fair, these two instances would be seen 
to be ethically problematic. 
 
 One may conjecture that Clarica knew, or should have known, much earlier than it did, that the City was 
subject to misrepresentations, but that is not our question.  We want to know whether a company in Clarica‟s 
situation should come to the aid specifically of a public sector entity, not because of a fraudulent or forced 
knowledge imbalance, but because of something particularly to do with good corporate citizenship.   
  
 Two ways this might be argued are as follows.  First, it might be claimed that in sophisticated financial 
transactions, governments will necessarily be over their heads when dealing with the private sector.  This would be 
very difficult to demonstrate given the amount of procurement that governments currently do with the private sector.  
We would need to evaluate specific situations which would note be feasible.  But, for the sake of argument, let us 
say in that in some particular situation this is so, that there is a knowledge imbalance.  If the public sector party 
could have access to expertise that would enable the imbalance to be addressed, then it seems that the fair dealing 
principle has not been breached, even if the public sector entity chose not to consult the available experts.  It would 
be different if the public sector entity was so unsophisticated that it simply did not know what knowledge it was 
lacking, and had no reasonable way of finding out.  In this case, on the face of it, there would be a moral obligation.  
But a knowledge imbalance in and of itself does not constitute an unfair deal.  For example, an art dealer who takes 
advantage of a neophyte who could have brought someone of expertise with him or her but chose not to do so, is not 
guilty of any moral infraction.  Hence, the good corporate citizen argument does not work if it is based on the 
presumption of governments having an inherent disadvantage, even if it is understood that the needed expertise may 
need to come from external consultations. 
 
 The second argument is that obligations of good corporate citizenship flow from membership in a 
community.  This is a very difficult issue to deal with in a short space.  There is an extensive body of literature that 
analyzes the concept of community and the extent to which corporations can be said to be part of various 
communities.  The general difficulty in grasping the essential nature of community membership is the ever-widening 
circle of what could be identified as the business community, global business community, and so on.  So, I propose 
to stay with the more manageable situation exemplified by the City of Waterloo and Clarica.  For, in this illustrative 
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case, we have a large national corporation that is a longstanding resident of the City, is one of the area‟s largest 
employers, and is involved in many social and charitable projects.  Why this is helpful is that it is possible to 
describe Clarica, or any company in similar circumstances, as in some sense being a part of the community without 
having to defend the idea of membership in communities that are conceptually or physically very large and remote 
from the actual community members who comprise the alleged community. 
 
 So, what about the general situation of a large company in a small or mid sized city?  Is there a special 
obligation of corporate citizenship?  In this restricted case, the answer is a qualified yes.  The rationale stems from 
the traditional notions of belonging to a community and believing in the importance of giving back to the 
community in which the company‟s employees live, work, enjoy public amenities, and share social interactions.  (To 
some extent, this is compatible with some feminist ethics positions that promote ethical conduct on the basis of 
values caring relationships.)  However, the moral standing of the company is not necessarily one of obligation in the 
strict sense.  For an obligation requires compliance.  If one repudiates or does not discharge a moral obligation, one 
is morally blameworthy.  I do not think this would be so in the case we are considering.  It is difficult to see why a 
corporation must, morally, proactively determine whether a government with whom it is doing business clearly 
knows all of the facts relevant to advancing its own interests.  This seems to go beyond a reasonable level of 
community commitment.  
 
 What does seem reasonable, though, is a variation of what is sometimes knows as the “Good Samaritan 
Principle”. Simply stated, the company may not be morally blameworthy for not looking out for the interests of its 
municipal counterpart, but it would be morally praiseworthy if it did. This is a softer form of moral agency that 
works off voluntary commitment rather than required conduct. In a sense, it captures something at the core of moral 
behavior, namely the intent to do the ethical thing. Archie Carroll refers to this as “Discretionary/philanthropic 
responsibility” (Archie Carroll, page 142-43). It is the acceptance by a company of a moral responsibility that it 
would not necessarily insist that other companies must likewise do. We would find it commendable if other 
companies accepted this responsibility. But we would not go so far as to condemn them if they did not.     
 
 What then would this suggest for municipal governance in general?  Of the ethical issues we have 
discussed, this is the most difficult in terms of suggested guidelines or rules.  While we can say that in situations 
where two or more parties are entering into a transaction, and it is clear that one of them is being mislead, 
misinformed or prevented from access to required information, it is the ethical obligation of the others to draw this 
to their attention.  This is applicable whether governments are involved or not.  But, does good corporate citizenship 
in dealing with governments require proactive steps to help?  That is going too far. 
 
7.  Concluding Note 
 
The RIM Park financing scandal continues to generate news in Waterloo, but this will eventually settle.  
Hopefully, though, it holds useful lessons for public sector governance in general.  Issues concerning the duty of 
care apply as much to the private as public sector.  It is difficult to pick up a newspaper today without seeking new 
corporate scandals and a trail back to the boardroom where directors were not discharging their most basic 
obligations.  Procurement, and issues around tendering, will increase as public-private-partnerships continue to 
expand.  Public infrastructure in most countries simply requires private capital, so the way governments and 
business deal with each other will become ever more pressing.  As this grows, so will issues around conflict of 
interest.  Partners in both the public and private sectors will need to clarify their guidelines and work hard to manage 
them.  Finally, the business dealings between the public and private sectors will require both to make an effort to 
understand each other‟s needs.  As to two sectors become closer as business partners, ethical dealings between them 
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